

Croydon Independent
Local Review Panel

Report into the rioting in Croydon on 8 and 9 August 2011

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Foreword and Introduction

by His Honour William Barnett QC, Chairman

It is with a sense of optimism and hope that I present this report of the Panel's review of the rioting that took place in Croydon on 8 August 2011.

Undertaking the review has, at times, been an unsettling experience. The Panel has met with many people whose homes, businesses and communities were destroyed or damaged by a relatively small number of criminals, who, for several hours, held areas of Croydon in a grip of fear, looting and wanton destruction.

That experience, though, has been offset by the many tales of heroism, bravery and resilience that we have also heard. The Panel has met with numerous people that risked their own safety to protect the communities that they live in. We have also heard from officers working for the Police, Fire Brigade and the Council as well as members of the public about the brave efforts that they made to restore order in Croydon on 8 and 9 August 2011 and the enormous efforts made to help families and businesses recover in the days, weeks and months that followed. The Panel has enjoyed hearing a great deal of commitment from local residents, businesses and public agencies to help improve the living and working conditions in our town.

At the outset of this report I would like to be clear that the work of the Panel has focused in depth on Croydon. We have spoken with the Chairman of

the National Communities and Victims Panel and the information that we have gathered during our review has been supplied, insofar as we have had permission, to the National Panel to help inform their findings. The Panel is aware that a number of other reports into the riots across the country have already been published and notes that there are areas of commonality between our findings and those of other reviews. I would like to make it very clear that, whilst the Panel has considered a number of other reviews, it has reached its conclusions on the basis of all the relevant information made available to it.

The Panel has investigated the likely reasons for what happened in order to identify what should be done now to prevent similar events from happening again. The nature of the Panel's work has led me to recall the words of the great Victorian judge, Baron Bramwell, who in a judgment that he delivered in 1869 said amongst other things that it would be "barbarous.....as I have often had occasion to tell juries, to hold that because the world gets wiser as it gets older, therefore it was foolish before"¹. In the spirit of those words, the Panel has undertaken this review on the basis that it is all too easy to be wise after the event.

The strength of this report is built on two key factors. First, the strong contribution made by people that live and work in Croydon, to whom the Panel expresses its profound gratitude.

¹ Hart v The Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company (1869) 21 L.T. 261, at 263. In Carstairs v Taylor (1871) L. R. Ex. 217 at 222 the same Judge made the point again saying "...when it is repaired, it will probably be repaired in such a way that this accident cannot occur again; but, as I have often said, to treat this as evidence of negligence is to say that whenever the world grows wiser it convicts those that came before of negligence."

We have received around 200 written contributions from members of the public and have also received written information from Croydon Council, the Metropolitan Police, British Transport Police, London Fire Brigade, Transport for London and local NHS providers. The Panel has taken into account all the written information that we have received and, in many instances, we have asked to meet with people to seek further clarification of their views and experiences. The Panel has met with no less than 64 people and we are extremely grateful to all those that have taken the time to attend and describe their experiences and views to us. We have held all but one of our meetings in public and advertised them extensively in advance. The Panel has held its meetings in a range of areas that were affected by the rioting and has held meetings in the evening and on a Saturday to make them as accessible to as many people as possible.

Secondly, the review has benefited from the diversity, skills, knowledge and experience of the Panel Members that I have had the privilege to work with over the past five months.

During the review, the Panel has heard a range of information relating to both the events in the immediate build-up to the rioting and looting and the less immediate longer term causes. This report details findings and recommendations designed to address both issues. We have also addressed a number of questions and views raised by people that participated in the review.

I should emphasise that the Panel has not excluded any information that we have received because it is reportage amounting to hearsay rather than direct evidence and we have drawn inferences from all the information we have received as we deem appropriate. All the Panel's findings are made on the basis of the balance of probabilities and our findings are of the majority where there is not unanimity.

The Panel has made a positive decision to limit the length of this report to around fifty pages. This is designed to encourage as many people as possible to read the report in full rather than rely on an executive summary.

The Panel is fully aware that the recommendations in this report are made in a particularly difficult financial climate and is well aware of the difficulties that all public service providers in Croydon are facing. That said, the long term financial, emotional and reputational costs of the rioting far exceed the investment required to avoid as far as reasonably practicable rioting and looting happening in our town again. The recommendations that the Panel has made are addressed to a number of different organisations and, on behalf of the Panel, I fully commend the contents of this report and its recommendations to each of those organisations and ask that they consider and accept them.

Finally, I would like to thank everyone that contributed to the review, my colleagues on the Panel and the small team of officers that provided administrative support for the review, namely Solomon Agutu and Stephen Rowan together with the able assistance of Maxine Cooper and Daniel Higgins. It is only right and proper that I should single out Stephen Rowan for special mention, as it is he who has been the conduit for our many requests for information and has been in day to day charge of gathering information for us and ensuring the attendance of witnesses and with success ensuring that everything ran smoothly. He is to be congratulated on his great industry and skill, and his patience and good humour at all times.



His Honour William Barnett QC

February 2012

Terms of Reference

1. To contribute local evidence to the National Communities and Victims Panel;

2. To examine why the civil disturbances/riots took place in Croydon, to record and place on the record what happened and how the various regional and local agencies responded;

3. To assemble written and oral information, review and sift relevant data;

4. To provide a summary of lessons to be learnt for the avoidance of a recurrence;

5. To make public the findings of the review and any recommendations; and

6. The time frame for completion of the work of the Panel is up to five months.

Section 1 :

What Happened

One of the Panel's key terms of reference was to "record and place on the record what happened" in Croydon during the riots.

It is important to set the rioting that took place in Croydon in the wider context of the rioting that took place across London and nationally between 6 and 10 August 2011. While this report is focused solely on what happened in Croydon, the Panel's review has heard a range of information regarding how the events that took place locally were influenced or connected to events that took place elsewhere in London. This point is particularly relevant when the Panel considered how pan-London agencies responded to the rioting in Croydon.

The Wider London and National Context

When considering what happened in Croydon, it has been useful to the Panel to establish what happened elsewhere before the rioting reached our town. The rioting began in Tottenham on the evening of Saturday 6 August 2011 in the aftermath of a peaceful protest march that was organised following the fatal shooting of Mark Duggan on Thursday 4 August 2011.

The rioting began in the commercial centre of Tottenham but quickly spread to Tottenham Hale Retail Park and looting was a key characteristic of the disturbances.

On 7 August 2011, further rioting and looting took place in the London Districts of Brixton, Enfield, Islington, Wood Green and Oxford Circus in central London.

On 8 August 2011, rioting and looting in London took place in Balham, Barking, Barnet, Battersea, Bayswater, Bethnal Green, Camberwell, Camden,

Catford, Charlton, Chelsea, Chingford, Chislehurst, Clapham Junction, Colliers Wood, Croydon, Ealing, East Dulwich, Enfield, Fulham, Hackney, Harlesden, Ilford, Islington, Lewisham, Notting Hill, Peckham, Romford, Streatham, Surrey Quays, Sutton, Tooting, Upminster, Walthamstow, Walworth Road and Woolwich.

Disturbance also began to spread outside London on 8 August 2011, with incidents being reported in Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool, Nottingham, Oxford and West Bromwich.

On the afternoon and evening of 9 August 2011, the number of Police Officers on duty in London was dramatically increased, peaking at 16,000, and incidences of rioting and looting were quickly brought to an end.

However, disturbances continued to spread nationally, with reports of rioting starting to come from Essex, Gloucestershire, Luton, Liverpool, Manchester and Salford on Wednesday 10 August 2011.

Thursday 11 August saw the rioting subside nationally, with no further large scale disturbances reported.

The Croydon Context

This section highlights key events that took place in Croydon before, during and after the rioting took place on 8 August 2011. Some of the events listed here are not, in the Panel's opinion, key to what took place but are included as they relate to issues that are addressed later in the report.

The tables below show a timeline of key events in Croydon and a summary of the impact of the riots:

Date	Time	Key Incident
6 August		Croydon Borough Commander, Chief Superintendent Roberts, deployed to command response to first riots in North London. Deputy Borough Commander, Superintendent Jo Oakley, takes command of Policing in Croydon.
7 August	<i>Overnight</i>	All on duty Grade 2 Public Order Officers deployed from Croydon to Metropolitan Police central command.
	<i>8.20pm – 11.00pm</i>	Limited incidents of disorder in Croydon, mainly targeting the Town Centre and Purley Way.
8 August	<i>2.00am – 4.30am</i>	Further incidents of disorder in Croydon, again mainly targeting the Town Centre and Purley Way.
	<i>9.00am</i>	First Police Gold Meeting held to plan for potential disturbances in Croydon.
	<i>9.00am</i>	Early intelligence is available to Croydon Police that Croydon Town Centre would be targeted from 4.00pm.
	<i>From 9.00am</i>	Increased Police presence in Town Centre.
	<i>9.30am</i>	'Mutual Aid' requested from other Police Forces by the Metropolitan Police Service.
	<i>From 12.00noon</i>	Reports of gatherings of young people and young adults in Croydon town centre.
	<i>12.15pm</i>	A 'section 60 Order' is issued by Croydon Police to extend stop and search powers across Croydon.
	<i>12.44pm</i>	Message of reassurance circulated to Croydon Councillors.
	<i>12.48pm</i>	Press statement issued 'Stay Away From Croydon' by Croydon Council.
	<i>1.00pm</i>	Second Police Gold Meeting held.
	<i>Between 4.00pm and 4.30pm</i>	Reports of looting at 5 different premises on London Road and the Whitgift Centre.
	<i>4.32pm</i>	Email circulated by Croydon Police to community stating that it is 'business as usual' in Croydon and that significant numbers of Police were available in the event of any unrest.
	<i>From 5.15pm</i>	Reports of gatherings of young people and young adults in West Croydon.
	<i>From 6.00pm</i>	Escalation of looting along the Purley Way.
	<i>Circa 6.15pm – 6.30pm</i>	A Police line is formed to close off North End at both ends.
	<i>6.25pm</i>	Attacks on Police Officers begin and looting escalates in West Croydon.
	<i>7.01pm</i>	Croydon Police request reinforcements from Metropolitan Police central command.
	<i>7.22pm</i>	Email circulated by Croydon Police requesting immediate assistance.
	<i>7.30pm</i>	First reported arson in London Road.
	<i>7.45pm</i>	Chief Inspector Nanji takes command of Police response in Croydon from Inspector Scrivener.
	<i>8.00pm</i>	First reports of sporadic incidents of disorder in New Addington, with seven incidents being reported up to 11.30pm.
<i>8.30pm</i>	Empty bus set alight on Tamworth Road.	
<i>8.30pm – 9.00pm</i>	A series of properties begin to be set alight in the London Road area.	
<i>Between 8.30pm and 8.45pm</i>	House of Reeves looted and set alight.	
<i>From 9.00pm until 3.00am</i>	Escalation of looting spreading to the east from London Road, North of St James's Road / Lower Addiscombe Road along White Horse Road, continuing until shortly before 3.00am.	
<i>9.15pm</i>	Chief Superintendent Musker takes operational command of Police response in Croydon and first reinforcements begin to arrive from Metropolitan Police central command.	

Date	Time	Key Incident
	<i>From around 9.00pm - 9.30pm until midnight</i>	Looting in South End.
	<i>10.30pm</i>	First Council rest centre established for people affected by rioting in the Town Centre and London Road areas.
	<i>11.15pm until 3.00am</i>	Disorder in Croydon Town Centre is brought under control, with looting and rioting becoming more sporadic.
	<i>11.40pm</i>	Croydon Council convenes its first 'Gold' recovery meeting, established to begin recovery planning.
9 August	<i>1.45am until circa 4.00am</i>	Further sporadic incidents of rioting and looting are reported in New Addington.
	<i>Circa 4.00am</i>	The Co-op store is looted and set alight in New Addington.
	<i>Circa 4.00am</i>	Croydon Council opens a 2nd Rest Centre New Addington.
	<i>4.00am</i>	Chief Superintendent Musker takes overall command of Croydon Police from the Deputy Borough Commander, Superintendent Jo Oakley.
	<i>5.30am</i>	The clean up of roads in central Croydon begins.
	<i>6.00am</i>	Chief Inspector MacMillan takes overall command of Croydon Police from Chief Superintendent Musker.
	<i>7.00am</i>	Croydon Council makes provisions for additional support for people displaced by the rioting, businesses affected by the rioting and for people with additional social care needs arising from the rioting.
	<i>9.00am</i>	A significantly increased Police presence is established throughout Croydon's main shopping and district centres.
	<i>9.00am</i>	Croydon Council begins supporting and co-ordinating volunteers.
	<i>9.00am</i>	A Business hotline is established to offer advice and support to affected businesses.
		Daily Business liaison meetings begin in the Town Centre.
	<i>Circa 1.00pm</i>	The Prime Minister, David Cameron, visits Croydon.
	<i>Circa 5.00pm</i>	The Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, visits Croydon.
10 August and beyond		Special loans are made available to affected businesses by Croydon Council from 15 August.
		The Mayor of London announces post riot funding on 17 August.
		The Prince of Wales and the Duchess of Cornwall visit Croydon to meet people affected by the rioting on 17 August.
		Free tram travel and parking is made available in Croydon Town Centre on the weekend of 20/21 August.
		A temporary community assistance centre (one stop shop) is opened on London Road on 26 August to provide advice and support to businesses and residents.
		Croydon Council begins awarding business rate relief to affected businesses from 29 August.
		Grant funding support is made available to businesses by Croydon Council from 29 August.

Impacts of the Riots in Croydon

The killing of Trevor Ellis in South Croydon
28 Properties were set alight on 8 and 9 August 2011
100 households were displaced
252 businesses were directly affected
12 businesses are still yet to get back up and running (latest information available 13 January 2012)
1 Police Officer injured
The iconic Reeves Corner furniture store was destroyed
The Co-op store in New Addington was closed until 15 December 2011
Significant travel disruption caused by damage to roads and tram lines
Reduced footfall throughout shopping centres following the rioting
416 Arrests (latest information available 23 January 2012)
186 Convictions (latest information available 13 January 2012)

Key Issues from the Timeline

A number of the issues detailed in the table above are dealt with in more detail in section two of this report, but there are several issues that require further explanation here.

Saturday 6 August 2011

Chief Superintendent Adrian Roberts, the then Croydon Police Borough Commander, is deployed to command the public order response to the rioting and looting in Tottenham. The Deputy Borough Commander, Superintendent Jo Oakley, took command of Policing in Croydon in Chief Superintendent Roberts' absence.

Sunday 7 August 2011

The scale of events that took place on Monday 8 August has quite understandably detracted focus from the events of Sunday 7 August 2011, though it is the Panel's opinion that these matters should be placed on record.

On Sunday 7 August, rioting and looting spread from Tottenham to a number of other areas across London. While there was not significant rioting in Croydon, there were a number of incidents that did take place. These included a number of semi-organised groups seeking to loot specific stores, mainly in the centre of Croydon, but also at least two stores on the Purley Way were targeted. The Police, with some support from the Council's CCTV control room, managed these incidents and made a number of arrests.

Monday 8 August 2011

Monday 8 August was a warm summer's day in Croydon and the weather remained warm and dry throughout.

At 9.00am on Monday 8 August 2011, the Croydon division of the Metropolitan Police held a local 'Gold' meeting. 'Gold' meetings are given this name by public sector plans for civil emergencies and are so called because they consider the highest level strategic issues. Gold group meetings are attended by the people in charge of public services to plan for or respond to emergencies. This particular Gold meeting was chaired by Superintendent Oakley and was attended by various other Police Officers and representatives of Croydon Council. Amongst a range of other actions, the meeting considered what intelligence was available at that time and agreed that messages of public reassurance be given and that a visible Police presence be maintained in the Town Centre. Arrangements also began to be made to ensure that Police Officers had their 'personal protective equipment' with them and that there were enough Police shields available for officers within the Borough.

At 1.00pm a further Gold meeting was held, again chaired by Superintendent Oakley, to which representatives of the Fire and Ambulance Services, British Transport Police and Surrey Police were also invited. At this meeting the developing intelligence picture was discussed and it was agreed that a highly visible Police presence in the town centre be maintained, that petrol stations in the area be contacted to ask them not to sell fuel in containers and for all Police officers to remain on duty for the evening.

Following the conclusion of that Gold meeting, the Borough Commander of the Fire Brigade, Commander Chris Bigland, relocated to the Council's CCTV control room in order to co-ordinate any response required by the fire brigade.

Premises in the main town centre shopping area began to close early during the course of the afternoon, some on the advice of the Police.

Between 4.00pm and 5.00pm, large groups of people began to gather in North End in Croydon Town Centre. All level two public order trained Police officers had already been redeployed from Croydon to other areas in London, either during the course of the weekend or earlier that day. 'Level two public order trained' refers to Police Officers that have undertaken a higher level of training on how to deal with public order incidents.

It follows that the Police officers present in Croydon Town Centre were not level two public order trained officers at this stage. Looting of some stores in Whitgift Shopping Centre and on London Road had begun by 4.30pm.

Between 5.00pm and 6.00pm, more groups of people gathered in Croydon Town Centre and reports of looting and disorder became more common, including incidents spreading to Surrey Street, and by around 6.00pm both ends of North End had been cordoned off by Police.

At around 6.25pm, Police officers started to come under attack from people gathered in the West Croydon and wider London Road area who were armed with makeshift weapons and projectiles. One unprotected PCSO was injured and required hospital treatment. Further arrangements were made for Police shields to be gathered from across the Borough for use by Police officers in the Town Centre.

The call for reinforcements was made by Police in Croydon to the Metropolitan Police Central Command at 7.01pm.

Between 6.45pm and 9.15pm, large scale looting and disorder took place in the West Croydon, London Road and Surrey Street areas. Looting in the Purley Way area escalated from 6.00pm and continued until 11.30pm.

Around 7.30pm, the first arson took place in the London Road area when a solicitors' office at 76 London Road was set alight. This was followed by the Somerfields store on London Road being set alight around 8.00pm and then by the torching of a bus on Tamworth Road at around 8.30pm. This was shortly followed by an arson attack on the pawnbrokers on the corner of London Road and Oakfield Road.

After rioters and looters began to start fires, the Police and Fire Services worked together to push back rioters to allow officers to attend the fires and ensure that people were not trapped inside the burning buildings. Rioters and looters attacked both Police and Fire officers while they were trying to attend fires.

At 7.45pm, Chief Inspector Nanji took operational control of the policing of the riots, known in the Police as 'Silver Command', from Inspector Scrivener.

At around 8.45pm, the Lidl supermarket on London Road was also set alight and at some time between 8.30pm and 8.45pm the House of Reeves furniture store at Reeves Corner was looted and set alight, pictures of which were seen around the world.

Consistent rioting and looting spread east of London Road, in the area north of St James's Road / Lower Addiscombe Road along White Horse Road from 9.00pm, with incidents continuing until around 3.00am.

The first level two public order trained police reinforcements began to arrive in Croydon from 9.15pm. Chief Superintendent Musker, a member of the Metropolitan Police Senior Public Order Cadre and then Wandsworth Borough Commander, arrived in Croydon at this time to take over 'Silver Command' of the policing of the disorder.

Between 9.15pm and around 11.15pm, large scale looting and rioting continued in central Croydon and South Croydon. After 11.15pm, rioting and looting began to subside but continued in a more sporadic nature until around 3.00am.

The Council opened a rest centre at 10.30pm at Taberner House to provide a place of refuge for people whose homes had been affected by the trouble.

The planning for the recovery began at 11.40pm, when Croydon Council established a Local Authority Gold group meeting to plan the immediate recovery actions required.

At 5.30am on the morning of Tuesday 9 August 2011, the clean up operation in the Town Centre began. All streets not subject to a Police cordon were cleaned by 7.50am. Dangerous Structures officers began to assess damaged buildings on London Road from 5.45am.

At 9.00am on Tuesday 9 August 2011, Superintendent Lawrie replaced Chief Superintendent Musker as the Police 'Silver Command'.

Rioting in New Addington

At 5.25pm on 8 August 2011, information was received that suggested that the New Addington area would be targeted by rioters. At this stage, Police car patrols were increased but, due to a lack of Officers, foot patrols were not increased.

A number of incidents of rioting and looting took place from around 8.00pm until around 11.30pm. After this time, the disorder appeared to subside until the early hours of 9 August 2011, when at around 4.00am the Co-op store at 7-10 Central Parade was looted and set alight.

The fire at 7-10 Central Parade affected a number of people living in homes above the shops and a second rest centre was established at the New Addington Community Centre, where approximately 60 displaced people were given refuge.

Areas of Croydon affected by rioting



The Police Response

During the course of this review, the Panel has heard a range of questions regarding the Police response to the riots and it is in this section of the report that those questions are dealt with.

Before the Rioting Began

In looking at the response by the Police, the first issues for the Panel to deal with relate to what actions the Police took before the rioting actually started in Croydon. It is useful at this stage to clarify what is meant by the 'Police'. The Metropolitan Police Service is responsible for policing across London as a whole. Croydon Police is a division of the Metropolitan Police Service. The rioting in Croydon was part of a widespread problem taking place across London and because of this, the Panel has had to look at decisions that were taken locally by Croydon Police and also centrally by the Metropolitan Police Service.

Was there intelligence that Croydon would be targeted?

The first of these issues is what intelligence was available to the Police that Croydon would be targeted by rioters. The Panel has spent some time looking at what information was available to the Police that may have indicated that Croydon would be subjected to the rioting.

It is clear that the Metropolitan Police Service had information that every London Borough, including Croydon, could come under attack on 8 August 2011. This information was considered locally by Croydon Police. However, the Panel recognises that there is a clear distinction between 'intelligence' and 'information' and that there are significant difficulties in assessing the quality of information that was being communicated across various social media networks.

The Panel has found that the sheer volume of information regarding potential riots across London on 7 and 8 August made it almost impossible for the Metropolitan Police to assess what information was or was not reliable or should have been prioritised. On the information that was available to Croydon Police before the rioting began, which the Panel has heard about, the Panel finds that this was acted on when practicable to do so bearing in mind the lack of Police officers available.

One of these actions was to put in place an order to exercise additional stop and search powers under Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. That Order was put in place by Croydon Police from 1.00pm on 8 August 2011 as a direct response to intelligence that the Police had received and assessed.

The Panel finds that there was no information or intelligence available at the Gold meetings that suggested that rioting and looting would take place on the scale that it did.

Recommendation 1

That the Metropolitan Police Service gives consideration to improving its processes for gathering and assessing information and intelligence from social media networks for the purposes of reducing crime and disorder.

Were actions taken quickly enough?

After considering the intelligence available to the Police, the Panel has considered whether actions were taken quickly enough based on the information available. This is a question that many people have asked the Panel, and a number of people have suggested that quicker actions could have either prevented or limited the rioting in Croydon. It should be pointed out that the question of whether reinforcements were called early enough is dealt with separately to this section.

The first Croydon Gold was convened by Croydon Police on Monday 8 August at 9.00am. It was chaired by the Deputy Borough Commander, Superintendent Oakley, and attended by a range of Police Officers and Council representatives. The Panel has seen the minutes of this meeting and the information that was available at that time. Having considered what information there was and what actions were agreed, the Panel finds that at this stage it appears that there was nothing that ought to have been done that was not done.

At 1.00pm that day, a further Croydon Gold group meeting was convened by the Police. The Panel can see from the record of this meeting that preventative actions were being taken, but that clearly no-one expected the scale of problems that took place in Croydon on that evening and that the information available at that stage did not suggest that there would be such large scale problems.

The Panel has spoken with people who run businesses in Croydon and has heard various accounts as to whether they were advised to close their businesses early. Based on the information that is available to the Panel, it has found that those businesses based outside the immediate town centre shopping area were unlikely to have received updated advice from either the Police or the Council during the course of 8 August 2011.

Recommendation 2

That the Police and Council give consideration to their communication strategies during large scale incidents to ensure that as many relevant people as possible, such as businesses, residents and community leaders, receive accurate and up to date information on evolving incidents as appropriate to the circumstances so that they can take steps to prevent or mitigate harm.

Available Policing Resources

Everyone accepts that, in the event, there were not enough Police Officers on duty to deal with the rioting across London and this also applies to Croydon. To a significant degree, this lack of numbers, both across London and locally, influenced what happened on 8 August 2011. The Panel has considered a number of possible actions that could have been taken both before and after the rioting had begun but has been left with the reality that such possibilities were not an option on the night because of the lack of available policing resources. The Panel has also asked why there was a lack of available policing resources both in Croydon and across the Metropolitan Police Service.

Moving the Borough Commander

A number of witnesses have asked the Panel why the Borough's then Police Commander, Chief Superintendent Roberts, was taken away from Croydon over the weekend immediately prior to 8 August 2011.

Having looked into this matter, the Panel can see that Chief Superintendent Roberts was deployed as 'Silver Command' for the incidents in Tottenham as a matter of routine. The Metropolitan Police Service maintains a rota of public order command trained officers and, on Saturday 6 August 2011, Chief Superintendent Roberts was the 'on call' officer for that role. As a consequence of this, he was called to take central command of the rioting after it had broken out in Tottenham.

The Panel has also considered whether a similarly trained officer, with Public Order Command training, should have been deployed to Croydon to replace the Chief Superintendent. The Deputy Borough Commander, Superintendent Oakley, was not level 2 public order trained or a public order command trained officer.

At the time when Chief Superintendent Roberts was moved, the Metropolitan Police Service did not have any intelligence that suggested that Croydon was such a specific risk that a similarly trained officer would need to be deployed to Croydon to replace him and in any event the Panel does not know if such an Officer was available.

Moving Croydon's Public Order Trained Police Officers

The second question that has been raised is whether there were enough Police officers in Croydon on 8 August 2011, specifically level 2 trained public order officers.

One of the reasons why some people feel that there were not enough Police Officers on duty in Croydon is because all Croydon's level 2 trained public order officers had been moved elsewhere in London over the course of the preceding weekend and on Monday 8 August 2011 itself.

Again, the Panel has looked carefully into this issue. The level 2 public order trained Police Officers were moved out of Croydon to central command as per the Metropolitan Police Service's mobilisation plan as it was in early August 2011. That Plan lays down the process that the Police should follow in the event of large scale incidents. In that sense, the Metropolitan Police were following their process and doing what they were supposed to do.

The Panel has also questioned whether the Police Mobilisation Plan took into account the risk factors for each Borough when considering which areas resources should be called from. Some people have suggested that in the light of the incidents that took place on the night of 7 August 2011, Croydon's large shopping centre, socio-economic problems in the north of the Borough and existing levels of crime should have highlighted Croydon as high risk when considering which areas the rioting could spread to. On that basis, some people have argued that Croydon should not have had its policing resources deployed elsewhere across London.

When looking at this issue in the context of the riots on 8 August 2011, the Panel has had to bear in mind that there were not enough Police resources available across London to deal with the widespread scale of the disorder. The Panel has not received enough information to be able to conclude whether such risk factors were considered or not but, the Panel does conclude that these factors should have been considered when the Metropolitan Police Service was considering which areas to move policing resources from.

	Inspectors, Sergeants and Acting Sergeants	Constables	Police Community Support Officers	Total
No. of Croydon Police staff initially on duty on 8 August 2011	45	130	40	215
No. of Croydon level 2 Public Order trained officers deployed elsewhere on 8 August 2011	10	50	0	60
No. of Croydon Police staff remaining in Croydon	35	80	40	155
No. of level 2 Public Order trained officers deployed to Croydon from 9.15pm onwards	16	84	0	100

The above table shows the numbers of Police Officers available in Croydon on 8 August 2011. It should be noted that not all of the Police Officers initially on duty on that day would have been deployed to respond to the rioting. Similarly, those numbers also do not reflect that the Police response was supported by a limited number of additional Police officers from the British Transport Police (1 Inspector, 3 Sergeants and 9 Police Constables) and the Metropolitan Special Constabulary. The Panel has also noted that no Police Officers in Croydon were allowed to go off duty on 8 August 2011.

Should those decisions have been reviewed?

While the Panel has seen that the Police were following the established procedure at the time the decisions were taken to move the Borough Commander and level two public order trained officers, it has also considered whether the Metropolitan Police Service should have reviewed these decisions when the scale of the disorder began to spread across London.

When looking at this issue, the Panel was particularly mindful of the number of people who raised questions regarding the command of Croydon Police over the course of 8 and 9 August 2011. It is clear to the Panel that the rioting only began to be brought under control following the arrival level 2 public order trained officers at 9.15pm. Those reinforcements included the arrival of Chief Superintendent Musker, who is

also a public order command trained officer. Chief Superintendent Musker took command of the operational policing response ('Silver' command) immediately upon arrival. Before that time, at least two other officers, an Inspector and a Chief Inspector, had been in command of the operational Police response to the rioting in Croydon.

While the Panel does not have enough information to reasonably conclude that the presence of a public order command trained officer would have prevented the rioting, it observes that the rioting was only brought under control once a public order trained commander and public order trained officers had been brought in to respond to the disorder.

Though the Panel can see that the redeployment of both Chief Superintendent Roberts and the level 2 trained public order officers were entirely in keeping with the process that the Police were following at that time, the Panel does find that removing **all** Level 2 Public Order trained officers was not the best course of action in the event and in the light of what was transpiring across London.

The Panel considers it sensible that future mobilisation plans identify and take account of the range of circumstances when a minimum number of such officers should be left in their home Boroughs and that additional risk assessments be undertaken when incidents spread over wider areas.

Calling For Reinforcements

That the Police were outnumbered by rioters was not just an issue in Croydon, the Metropolitan Police Service has stated that this was the case across London as a whole.

When questioning whether reinforcements were called quickly enough, the Panel has had to consider this in two stages. The first is at the local level, where Croydon Police would call for reinforcements by contacting the central command of the Metropolitan Police Service for reinforcements to be sent from elsewhere within the Service. The second stage is at the pan-London level, where the Metropolitan Police Service as a whole can seek reinforcements either informally from neighbouring forces or formally through the 'Mutual Aid' system.

The Local Level

A number of people have asked whether Croydon Police called for reinforcements quickly enough. The Police records show that reinforcements were first called for at 7.01pm and this was approximately thirty five minutes after the Police started to come under attack. Reinforcements eventually began to arrive approximately two and a quarter hours later at 9.15pm.

The Panel has questioned why reinforcements were not sought sooner by Croydon Police. It is unclear as to the exact time that Police Officers were outnumbered, but gatherings and looting began to escalate between 5.30pm and 6.00pm. As there were no level two public order trained officers in the Borough at that time, Croydon Police were aware that they only had sufficient resources to contain a small number of incidents. The Panel finds that it was an error of judgement by Croydon Police for public order trained officers not to have been sought earlier.

In making this finding, the Panel is aware that it does not have sufficient information to say whether or not Croydon Police had informally sought reinforcements any earlier than the

recorded time of 7.01pm. The Panel would have liked to have heard from other Police Officers that were in command of Croydon Police prior to 9.15pm. Despite this, during the course of this review, the Metropolitan Police Service nominated Chief Superintendent Musker, who by that time had become the permanent Borough Commander for Croydon, to represent their Service as a whole and he was unfortunately in no position to answer the Panel's question on this subject because he had not been present in Croydon before 9.15pm on 8 August 2011.

Police Resources at the London Level

Given that the lack of available Police officers was such a critical issue over the course of 6-8 August 2011, the Panel has also considered why there were not enough Police resources across London generally to deal with the widespread rioting.

In considering this question, the Panel took into consideration the Independent Review of Policing prepared by Sir Ronnie Flanagan GBE QPM and published in 2008. The Panel gave particular attention to section 5 of that report, which states:

“5.13 Our use of processes has become disproportionate. The answer partially lies in our current approach to risk. Our processes are designed to 'Rolls Royce' standard, which we then struggle to implement and use efficiently on a day to day basis. This is underpinned by two drivers:

- 1 Internally – a 'just in case' mentality, which leads to every process being designed to the worst case scenario without regard to how it will be handled by thousands of officers on a day to day basis.
- 2 Externally – a public approach, vocalised by the media and politicians, that 'this must never happen again' – which results in the same outcome. Over recent years we have started to see an even more insidious extension: the expectation that the service should have anticipated events and incidents that are well beyond their control.”

In considering this report, the Panel understood it to mean that Police Forces should be resourced to what would be reasonably expected and proportionate and not to cater for every possible eventuality that could arise. This was a view that the Panel agreed with, and it did hear from a former Croydon Police Officer that, during his time with the Metropolitan Police Force, contingency plans were prepared with consideration for up to 8 major public order incidents taking place in London at the same time.

On 8 August 2011, disorder took place in at least 22 London Boroughs, and it is clear to the Panel that the Metropolitan Police Service is not resourced, and nor does it plan, to deal with public disorder across London on this scale.

The Panel also noted that the rioting and looting took place during the school summer holidays. This issue is discussed in greater detail later in this report, but is mentioned now as the impact of school holidays is also a matter that should be considered when looking at the amount of policing resource available on 8 August 2011.

Calling for 'Mutual Aid'

Given the lack of available Policing resources across London, the Panel has also looked at whether the Metropolitan Police Service could have sought outside assistance sooner. This issue has been considered in the wider context of the cumulative policing decisions that affected Croydon, in order to establish if there is anything else that could have been done.

The Panel has specifically considered whether the Metropolitan Police Service requested assistance from other Police Forces quickly enough. This question has been raised by a number of people and the Panel has given it detailed consideration.

Police Forces can normally seek assistance through two different routes. The first is to informally ask neighbouring forces for assistance; the second is to submit a formal request for 'Mutual Aid' through a nationally co-ordinated scheme.

Over the course of 6 and 7 August 2011, the Metropolitan Police Service central command sought and received informal assistance from neighbouring Forces, and the Panel heard first hand accounts of officers from other forces being present in Tottenham in the early hours of 7 August 2011 following the initial disturbances.

The Panel sees that formal assistance was sought by the Metropolitan Police Service through the 'Mutual Aid' scheme on Monday 8 August 2011 at 9.30am. The Panel also heard that the Metropolitan Police Service has only previously used the Mutual Aid scheme on a pre-planned basis, and has never before sought aid during an ongoing incident.

While noting that the Metropolitan Police Service is not resourced to respond to the level of disorder that took place over the course of 6-8 August 2011, the Panel must then naturally ask whether 'Mutual Aid' should have been sought sooner and whether more thorough risk assessments on 7 August 2011 would have assisted the Metropolitan Police Service in deciding to make the decision to formally ask for help sooner.

The Panel does recognise that the rioting across London on 6 and 7 August 2011 happened quickly and, to a greater or lesser extent, the spreading of the disorder was not expected. With that in mind, the Panel is aware that the timeframe in which Mutual Aid could have been obtained any sooner than it was is likely to have been a matter of hours. That said, the Panel is particularly mindful that Croydon Police had to wait for two and a quarter hours for reinforcements to arrive after they were requested from the Metropolitan Police Service central command and that it was during this period that the majority of damage and looting took place in Croydon.

The Panel has not received sufficient information to make a fair conclusion on why Mutual Aid was not formally requested sooner, but on the face of the limited information available, the Panel concludes that had Mutual Aid been formally sought and obtained earlier by the Metropolitan Police Service, it could have helped limit the extent of rioting and looting that took place in Croydon. It was an error of judgement that the Metropolitan Police Service did not seek reinforcements through the 'Mutual Aid' scheme earlier.

Did the Police Communication System Fail?

The Panel heard a number of people raise the issue of whether the Police communication system, including the airwave radio system, was adequate on 8 August 2011. The Panel has heard conflicting opinions on this matter and does not have sufficient information to reach a firm conclusion. That said, the Panel did hear from several sources of the difficulties being encountered by the Police Officer present at the CCTV control room in communicating with the Police command and, to that end, the Panel does find that consideration should be given to improving the system for Police Officers to communicate with their command from the Council CCTV control room during major incidents.

Recommendation 3

The Panel supports the Metropolitan Police Service's decision to review its mobilisation plan and recommends that consideration be given to:

- i) Directing Level 2 support units from other Boroughs directly to places where they are required rather than gathered in a central area;
- ii) Increasing the number of Level 2 trained officers across the service;
- iii) How the plan is likely to be affected during school holiday periods when public services are likely to be reduced by higher numbers of officers and staff being on annual leave;
- iv) Earlier requests for assistance from other Police Forces, either informally or through the mutual aid scheme;
- v) How the Police communication network is affected by large scale incidents taking place in multiple areas across London at the same time;
- vi) The risk assessment arrangements for Boroughs that have Policing resources taken for use elsewhere and the stages at which provision in those Boroughs is reviewed;
- vii) Ensuring that Boroughs that have their Level 2 public order trained Policing resources taken for use elsewhere are not left without any Level 2 public order trained resources; and
- viii) Taking into account the requirements of areas outside immediate town centres when considering the level of Policing resources required for incidents.

Were the Police protecting the Whitgift Centre and Centrale?

When meeting with people that were directly affected by the riots, the Panel has heard a number of people express the view that the Police appeared to protect the main shopping centres and allowed the rioters and looters to have free rein in West Croydon.

The Panel has looked into this suggestion very carefully and has taken into account the views of local residents and shopkeepers as well as the Police and other agencies.

From the information available, the Panel has found that following attempts to loot shops in Centrale, the Whitgift Centre and Alders, the Police created a cordon at either end of North End. Those attacks on these shopping centres took place at the beginning of the disorder and the Police, at that stage, took the decision to clear North End of the people that were gathering there and to establish the cordon.

The physical geography of the Town Centre meant that there are only a limited number of places where a cordon could be created without the rioters and looters being able to use side streets to work their way in behind the Police line.

After establishing that cordon, the Police did not have sufficient resources to safely push the rioters either further back or to make targeted arrests until reinforcements arrived some two and a quarter hours later. In order to make arrests of rioters outside the cordon, between three and five Police Officers would be required for each rioter arrested. There were not sufficient Police Officers available before at least 9.15pm for the Police to safely break their lines to make individual arrests.

In the event, the Police line was moved after buildings started to be torched, in order to secure the safety of fire fighters attending those fires and to allow searches of those buildings to be undertaken, in case people were trapped inside. The Police were left with little option but to take this course of action and did so at great personal risk as it left the Police line exposed to attack from the rear until reinforcements began to arrive at 9.15pm.

The Panel did not find that the Police had taken any deliberate decision to protect the main shopping centres at the cost of other areas and nor were they ordered to do so by any other outside party. The Panel concluded that retail units on London Road were mainly targeted as looters had been pushed back from North End by the Police.

The Recovery

The Panel has heard very little, if any, criticism of statutory agencies response following the rioting on 8 August 2011. In fact, the Panel has heard a great deal of praise for the way in which agencies and local communities have responded to the riots and helped and supported people living and working in their communities.

The following section places on record the Panel's findings of what happened and how affected people were supported following the riots.

The recovery from the rioting began at 11.40pm on Monday 8 August 2011 when Croydon Council established a Local Authority Gold group meeting. That meeting established two teams to focus on the immediate actions to be taken over the next 24 hours and then what needed to be done after that.

In the immediate aftermath of the riots, there were three primary areas of recovery work undertaken, namely providing housing and social care to those persons made homeless by the riots; dealing with the physical effects of the riots in terms of securing damaged buildings and cleaning the affected areas; and supporting businesses that were affected by the rioting.

Displaced Households

On the night of 8 August 2011, a total of 100 households were displaced by the rioting. Some of these people either lost their homes because of the fires or could not return home due to loss of electricity.

In total, 47 households received Bed and Breakfast placements via the Council's housing team. 38 households were able to return home and 15 households obtained alternative accommodation via their own means or with support from their landlords. By 30 September 2011, all but nine households had moved into new permanent accommodation. Of the nine households that had not, four had received offers at that time and have now moved into their permanent accommodation. Five were subject to Home Office investigations into their immigration status. A total of £93,000 in additional welfare payments was distributed to the affected households and additional support was provided by replacing essential household goods and working with charities for the homeless to provide furniture and other household items.

A number of households required access to benefits and welfare support as a result of the rioting and the Council organised dedicated support for these people to help prioritise their applications. A temporary 'one stop shop' was established by the Council in the CVA building on London Road, which provided dedicated support and advice to families and businesses affected by the riots. The Council and the Department for Work and Pensions worked together to support those people made unemployed by the riots and to prioritise their claims.

Highways and Buildings

The operation to clean roads and streets affected by rioting began at 5.30am on 9 August 2011 and was completed in central Croydon by 7.50am that day. Local volunteers began further clean ups on 10 August 2011 in West Croydon, and these volunteers were joined by Council contractors who also supplied gloves, brooms and refuse sacks.

All roads were immediately open, save for a section of London Road and Reeves Corner that were both crime scenes. These areas needed significant work as fire damage had destroyed the road surface, traffic lights and road signs and the fire damaged buildings posed a potential threat to pedestrians and traffic. A couple of people that met with the Panel did mention that there had been small delays in making repairs to road signs in the Reeves Corner area.

Two highways officers were dedicated to recovery works and diversion routes were established immediately. The Council worked with Transport for London to undertake all necessary works to make these roads safe and Reeves Corner was fully reopened on 16 August 2011 and London Road was fully reopened on 4 September 2011.

The tram line passing Reeves Corner was also damaged by the fire and tram services through central Croydon were unable to operate from 9 August 2011. Transport for London staff and contractors worked round the clock to repair and replace the line and full tram services were reinstated on Friday 12 August 2011.

Supporting Affected Businesses

From 19 August 2011, daily business briefings were held in the Town Centre to brief business owners on the support being made available to them and to allow issues to be raised with officers. The Council also established a dedicated business hotline to allow affected businesses to speak to specialist support.

One off grant funds of £1,000 were distributed to 249 businesses to assist with immediate cash flow issues and to help with repairs following the riots. In addition, business rate discounts were also given to each of these businesses and an interest free loan scheme was also put in place.

Council officers visited businesses in affected areas on a door-to-door basis to promote awareness of the available schemes and to offer support in making insurance claims either via insurers or under the Riot Damages Act scheme.

On 20 and 21 August 2011, Croydon Council and Transport for London held an event to encourage shoppers back into Croydon which included free parking and free tram travel.

The Metropolitan Police Service maintained a highly visible presence in Town and district centres to ensure that there was no further resurgence of the unrest. Neighbourhood enforcement officers (council officers that investigate anti-social behaviour and environmental crime) were redeployed to Town and District Centres for three weeks after the riots to support colleagues and Police teams.

As part of its longer term response, the Council has introduced free 30 minute parking spaces and additional bays in London Road to encourage the economic recovery in this area.

Other Recovery Measures

A range of measures were also undertaken to help the wider community recovery from the rioting. Open support sessions were held in Sumner Road for people affected by the rioting in the immediate days following 8 August. A number of public meetings were held in the areas affected by the rioting and were attended by the Police and the Council and a number of specific meetings were also held to engage with young people across Croydon.

A late night call centre was opened in the days following the riots to help co-ordinate public volunteers and Council officers worked with volunteers to help arrange the distribution of donations made by the public to households affected by the rioting. The Council worked with Croydon Voluntary Action (the CVA) to direct people that wanted to volunteer following the riots.

A publicity campaign was organised by the Council in partnership with the Police, with posters being displayed asking for help identifying suspected rioters and later publicising the numbers of people arrested. This was followed by the 'I love Croydon' campaign designed to promote the many positive things about living and working in Croydon.

An area where the Panel did hear criticism was that of delays in payments made under the Riot Damages Act. The Panel heard information regarding delays in payments and difficulties in procedures that took little or no account that some claimants could have had some or all of their documentation destroyed.

The Panel was particularly concerned regarding this point and noted that it had received no direct information that anyone in Croydon had received a payout under this Act by January 2012.

Recommendation 4

That the Government reform the processes by which payments are currently made under the Riot Damages Act in order to achieve quicker payments for persons claiming under that Act.

Section 2 :

The causes of the rioting in Croydon

Why did people riot in Croydon?

The question of why people rioted in Croydon does not have a single straightforward answer. In this section we deal with various reasons and hypothesis that have been suggested to the Panel and detail the Panel's findings on this question.

In the first instance, a great many people have asked the Panel whether the rioting in Croydon had anything to do with the protest that had taken place in Tottenham on Saturday 6 August 2011 following the killing of Mark Duggan.

Dealing with this question at the outset, the Panel has looked at all the information available and has found that the riots in Croydon were not a protest against the Police but also that they would not have happened **when** they did if Mr Duggan had not been killed. In Croydon there was comparatively little direct confrontation with the Police. The riots in Croydon primarily involved destruction of premises and consequent looting and harassment and intimidation of local law abiding people.

While the Panel has found that the rioting in Croydon would not have happened **when** it did if Mark Duggan had not been killed, the Panel does not consider that this was the sole spark that set off the rioting in Croydon. The prime spark was the impression that people, particularly young men, could loot freely, and that impression was given by publicity of people looting unchallenged in Tottenham and subsequently other areas through television and other media throughout Sunday 7 August and Monday 8 August 2011. Over that weekend, a great many people saw images and heard reports that suggested that there was an opportunity to loot with the appearance of no consequences, that mob rule had taken control of parts of London and this gave temptation to people to riot.

Furthermore, the Panel found that this prime spark, without some addition to it, was not enough to set off the riots in Croydon. The Panel found that a range of other pre-existing issues and conditions had to be in place. These issues are described in more detail later in this section of the report and, for example related to issues which included poverty, lack of opportunity, poor living conditions, poor environmental conditions, stop and search, levels of unemployment and the numbers of young people not in education, employment or training.

Was Croydon targeted by Criminals from across London?

From the outset of this review, the Panel has heard contributions from a range of persons who felt that Croydon was targeted for looting by a core of organised criminals on 8 August 2011. The Panel has given this point careful attention when meeting with residents, business owners and agencies and when considering the facts that are known at this stage.

While the Panel has heard first hand accounts of higher volumes of people at Croydon train stations, people being sighted making their way into the Town Centre and of different faces being present in the London Road area, it has weighed this information against the latest available data that has been provided by the Metropolitan Police. That information, detailed in the table below, shows that 64.41% of identified suspects (latest information available 12 December 2011) involved in the rioting in Croydon lived in the London Borough of Croydon.

Area	No. of Suspects	%age of Suspects
Brent (QK)	2	0.40
Bromley (PY)	11	2.19
Croydon (ZD)	324	64.41
Enfield (YE)	3	0.60
Greenwich (RG)	1	0.20
Haringey (YR)	1	0.20
Lambeth (LX)	54	10.74
Lewisham (PL)	8	1.59
Merton (VW)	17	3.38
Newham (KF)	1	0.20
Richmond upon Thames (TW)	1	0.20
Southwark (MD)	8	1.59
Sutton (ZT)	12	2.39
Waltham Forest (JC)	3	0.60
Tower Hamlets (HT)	1	0.20
Wandsworth (WW)	10	1.99
Westminster (CW)	1	0.20
Other	45	8.95

When meeting with the Metropolitan Police, the Panel questioned whether these figures were a fair representation and asked if Croydon residents would have been easier to identify. The view held by the Metropolitan Police was that the figures were a fair representation of the totality of people that rioted and looted on 8 August 2011.

The Panel has found that, while there is some evidence that some people came into Croydon to loot, it is not the case that people came to Croydon en masse from across London to riot and loot.

In keeping with the question of whether rioters were Croydon residents or lived elsewhere, the Panel was asked to consider whether Croydon's location and good transport links were a key factor in the rioting.

As mentioned above, the Panel found that the majority of rioters were Croydon residents, but does agree that Croydon's location and transport links would have benefited those rioters and looters that travelled into the town centre from either other parts of Croydon or from outside the Borough.

The Panel did consider the question of whether closing down the transport network earlier would have helped reduce the scale of disorder on 8 August 2011. Having considered a range of information on this question, the Panel finds that it would not have been likely to have made a significant difference. The reason for this is that the majority of rioters did not come to Croydon using the transport network and that a great number of people who were not involved in the rioting needed to use the transport network to come either into or out of Croydon to get home.

Who rioted in Croydon?

While this review has taken place some months after the rioting took place, it is still relatively early in terms of detailed and meaningful analysis of the makeup of the rioters being undertaken. This is due to a number of reasons, not least because both the Police investigation and subsequent Court proceedings are still actively ongoing and also because the most recently available census data is now eleven years old.


Where the rioters came from

That said, there are a number of figures that can be presented that are useful in identifying who rioted. The table (above left) shows that the majority of **suspected** rioters in Croydon (as at 12 December 2011) came from Croydon.

The Panel has also had access to information regarding those people **arrested** for rioting in Croydon.

The following table looks at which Wards people that live in Croydon and were arrested for rioting come from.

Ward Breakdown of the Arrested Rioters from Croydon



Number of people arrested from each Ward As at 15th December 2011


The table shows that rioters came from every Ward in Croydon. The table also shows that rioters came from the areas that were affected by the rioting.

How old were the rioters?

It has been a characteristic of this review that the term 'young people' has often been used as a label to describe the age of people that rioted. The Panel has not always found this to be a useful or precise term and has instead looked at bands of ages. Those bands are: 17 and under; 18s to 25s; and over 25s. The Panel has found this to be a useful way of separating children, young adults and adults.

The following chart describes the proportions of people that live in Croydon and were arrested for rioting within those age bands.

Age breakdown of Arrested Rioters from Croydon



As at 15th December 2011

The chart shows that the vast majority of rioters were in fact adults (people aged 18 and over - 80.74%), with the largest group being young adults (49.63%).

What role did race play?

A good number of people that have met with the Panel have asked what role race has played in the rioting in Croydon. As described later in this section, the Panel has not found that these were racially motivated riots, insofar as they were not a protest by a specific race of people or ethnic group in response to a particular issue.


However, the Panel has considered whether any particular ethnic groups were more prominent in the rioting than others, and if so, why?

The table below shows a breakdown of people that live in Croydon that were arrested for rioting, broken down by Police 'IC' codes. These codes are used by the Police to describe the apparent ethnicity of a suspect, and in that sense, are likely to be less accurate than individual self-definitions of race or ethnicity.

The 'IC' codes used by the Police are as follows:

- IC1** White
- IC2** Mediterranean/Hispanic
- IC3** Black African/Afro-Caribbean
- IC4** Pakistani, Indian, Nepalese, Maldivian, Sri Lankan, Bangladeshi, or any other (South) Asian
- IC5** Chinese, Japanese, or South-East Asian
- IC6** Arabic, Egyptian, Tunisian, Algerian or Maghreb
- IC7** Origin unknown

Police IC Code Breakdown for Arrested Rioters from Croydon



As at 15th December 2011

The above chart shows that the vast majority of rioters were either 'black' IC3 or 'white' IC1 (collectively 87.03%) and that the largest group of rioters was 'black' people IC3 at 54.81%.

As mentioned in the preceding section of this report, it is difficult to consider this information without putting it into context. Unfortunately, the Panel has not been able to contrast these figures with the ethnic make up of each Ward or the ethnic make-up of the Borough that is aged 18-25 (49.63% of rioters were within that age range).

Addressing the underlying tensions and disaffections that existed before the rioting will be an important task in trying to prevent rioting taking place in the future. It will be of significant use for local agencies to be aware of which, if any, ethnic groups are over represented in the rioting when a full analysis is carried out.

Ongoing Analysis of Rioters

The Panel is of the opinion that thorough detailed analysis of the people that chose to riot and why, must be undertaken as and when more information becomes available. Proper and full analysis of that information will help to understand who rioted and inform efforts to tackle pre-existing issues within the communities where the riots took place.

Recommendation 5

That the local Community Safety Partnership undertakes detailed analysis of the profiles of persons convicted of rioting in Croydon to provide further understanding of who rioted in Croydon and why.

Why did Croydon suffer such significant damage?

The level of rioting and looting in Croydon was very high when contrasted with other areas affected by rioting, in particular the physical damage caused to buildings by looters and arsonists. The disturbances in Croydon were also largely focused on looting, whereas disturbances in some other areas had greater elements of protest as well as looting.

A number of people that have met with the Panel have asked why this was the case. When addressing this question, one of the first points that the Panel has had to consider is how Croydon fits in with the rioting across the rest of London.

The resources available to the Metropolitan Police Service had been stretched over the weekend preceding the rioting in Croydon and the Panel has noted that Croydon was one of the last areas to be subjected to rioting and looting. The Panel has heard from some people that, because Croydon was one of the last areas to be hit, the 'tank was dry' in terms of policing resources available.

The Panel has found that the lack of Police Officers on duty, both across the Metropolitan Police Service and in Croydon in particular, played a significant part in the Croydon riots. The Police did not have enough officers to carry out appropriate arrests on the night. In particular, the Police were unable to make arrests outside the cordons at either end of North End as between three and five officers would have been required for each arrest and the Police did not have sufficient numbers to make those arrests and maintain the cordons. The period of around two and three quarter hours where rioters were relatively unchallenged contributed significantly to the level of damage as the rioters and looters had such a significant opportunity to get drawn into events, become excited and cause extended damage.

While making the above findings, the Panel would like to stress that it is not attributing any blame to those officers who were making their best efforts to protect Croydon on 8 August 2011. On the contrary, the Panel is keen to express its gratitude and thanks to all of the officers who worked for long hours at risk to their own personal safety trying to defend Croydon.

Recommendation 6

That the Metropolitan Police Service gives consideration to how best to rebuild confidence in the wider community following the riots, particularly with regard to those communities that are historically disconnected from the Police.

The Panel spent a lot of time considering the question of why there were so many fires in Croydon. There were a number of theories put forward on this issue, namely:

- i) to destroy evidence in premises that had been looted;
- ii) to divert Police away from more lucrative targets for looters;
- iii) that the delay caused by the time taken to make it safe for fire fighters to put out the first fires encouraged more fires to be lit;
- iv) that the long period of time that looting and rioting went unchallenged in some areas gave rioters greater opportunity to start fires; and
- v) that fires were lit elsewhere because looters were frustrated because they did not have the opportunity to loot the more lucrative shops in North End.

The Panel felt that it did not have enough information to make a definitive finding on this issue, and that one or more of the above reasons could have applied to some of the instances of arson.

When considering the level of damage in Croydon, the Panel has noted that the riots took place during school holidays and assessed whether this was a factor. The Panel has found that the fact that it was school / summer holidays did contribute to the riots. Because of summer holidays, more police officers than normal were on annual leave and more people were on the streets of Croydon during the afternoon.

Recommendation 7

That local agencies give consideration in the round to planning for summer holiday periods to mitigate the circumstances of the impact of high levels of annual leave on public services and large numbers of children and young people not attending school, college or university.

What roles did the press and social media play in the spread of the riots?

Many people who have contributed to this review have suggested that the press and social media networks played a role in the spread of rioting to Croydon.

While the Panel recognises that the reporting of the rioting was an essential function of the media, it does find that as news spread that looting was taking place unchallenged elsewhere, the Panel found that this was a spark, in conjunction with the pre-existing disaffection and tensions, that set looting and rioting off in Croydon.

Similarly, the Panel recognises the important role that social media played in allowing the vast majority of people who did not riot to keep updated of potential trouble spots and to communicate with friends and family.

Did gangs organise the riots?

It has also been suggested that gangs in Croydon may have, either individually or collectively, organised some of the rioting that took place in Croydon. The Panel has found that existing gangs did not play a pivotal role in the rioting and looting in Croydon.

While the Panel heard some reports that a truce had been called amongst gangs to permit all local gangs to riot and loot, there was no evidence to support that this was actually the case. However, the Panel did see information that supported the view that there were some elements of organised looting in Croydon and that people who were members of gangs individually participated in the looting but not necessarily as a gang.

Was the rioting caused by drinking and drugs?

Another issue raised by some people that met with the Panel was the suggestion that the riots may have been fuelled by drugs and alcohol.

Based on the information available to the Panel, it has found that drink and drugs did not play a significant role in the cause of the riots on 8 August 2011, other than that alcohol and tobacco were targeted by looters. However, the Panel did hear a range of information relating to the levels of drug use and drug dealing in the London Road area that already existed before the riots and that this was part of a range of issues that cumulatively led to underlying disaffection amongst some local residents.

Underlying tensions and disaffection

Readers of this report will no doubt be aware that other reports into the August rioting from elsewhere have identified a range of longer term causal factors as to why a large number of people were so ready to come out to riot and loot.

The Panel has also considered this question, though in a Croydon context, and has spoken about the underlying causes with almost everyone that it has met. The Panel has also considered a wide range of written information on this subject.


A document that the Panel has considered is the Black Radley report into the Lozells disturbances in Birmingham in 2005, published in 2007. That report identifies three 'necessary ingredients', each ingredient comprising one or more of the items set out in the diagram below, that would be present before any spark is able to mobilise people to riot. There is one significant difference between the two disturbances, and that is that the rioting in Lozells was partly due to the manifestation of tensions arising between different ethnic communities in that area. The Panel is clear, as previously stated, that this was not the case in Croydon.

The Panel has taken account of the diagram below and the conclusions of that report and its findings as to the causes of disturbances and 'flare up' in instances of rioting.

A wide range of different issues have been raised with the Panel and were suggested as the underlying cause of the riots. However, the Panel cannot find that any one issue was more or less significant than the other, as each issue, or combination of issues, would have had a varying effect on each individual that chose to riot. That said, the Panel does find that these issues collectively form a melting pot of underlying tensions that were present before the rioting took place and collectively were underlying causes of the riots, disturbances and 'flare up'.

Those issues raised by people who met with the Panel highlighted 'stop and search', unemployment and lack of opportunities amongst people living in areas affected by the riots. While the Panel finds that these issues were not the direct causes of the rioting, the Panel does agree that these issues were contributory factors in the riots insofar as they were, together, cumulative causes of longer term disaffection.

Similarly, a number of people raised the issue of existing conditions in some parts of North Croydon as a contributory factor in the riots. Overcrowding, the physical environment, high levels of crime and the high levels of poverty in the areas of London Road were all cumulative causes of disaffection in the area.



Ingredients of a disturbance
© Black Radley Ltd 2007

With particular regard to stop and search, the Panel heard from several sources that the need for stop and search was, in principle, accepted and that it played a significant role in reducing murder and knife crime. However, experiences of the way in which stop and search had been conducted were cited as a cause of disaffection with the Police. To that end, the Panel welcomes the Metropolitan Police Commissioner's recent announcement that stop and search tactics in London will be reformed and Chief Superintendent Musker's assertion that funding had been secured for young people to speak with Police Officers about the impact of being stopped and searched.

Recommendation 8

That the Metropolitan Police Service's review of its stop and search policy includes consideration of:

- i) a reduction in the overall number of stop and searches that are not intelligence based to achieve better targeting of the use of stop and search;
- ii) ensuring as far as reasonably possible that stop and search is undertaken in a dignified manner that does not cause disaffection with those persons being stopped and searched; and
- iii) providing every person stopped and searched with written reasons for doing so unless statute provides to the contrary.

A significant number of people also expressed views regarding parenting as a causal factor of the rioting. The Panel heard that single parent families, discipline at home and general standards of parenting were all longer term causes of the disaffection that contributed to some people's decision to riot and loot on 8 August 2011.

The Panel considered this issue in detail and heard a range of information that supported the view that 'chaotic' and 'disorganised' family life could have a significant impact on a child's life chances. However, the Panel did hear that the number of parents actively involved in raising a child was a less significant factor than the quality of the parenting and family life that a child experienced. The Panel was particularly impressed by the targeted work being undertaken by the Turnaround Centre and by the Family Resilience team in order to address these issues. The Panel also noted the historic issue of high rates of teenage pregnancy in Croydon, and the likelihood that teenage parents would have other social difficulties. The Panel is aware that this, and issues around the quality of parenting, are long term issues for which there is not a quick solution.

Section 3 :

Learning the Lessons

The terms of reference of this review asked the Panel to provide a summary of lessons to be learnt for the avoidance of a recurrence. As has been mentioned elsewhere in this report, the findings and recommendations made here are not designed to attach blame and are made with the wisdom of hindsight.

This section of the report details those issues where a positive recommendation has been made by the Panel. It also addresses a number of suggestions made by people who contributed to the review. It is divided chiefly into two sections, namely those points relating immediately to the riots and then those points relating to the longer term causal factors.

What Could Help if Riots Happen Again?

More Police Resources?

As mentioned earlier in the report, the key issue has been the lack of Police resources available in Croydon on 8 August 2011. The Panel found that the moving of all public order trained Police Officers from Croydon was not the best course of action in the event and in the light of what was transpiring. The Panel also found that it was an error of judgement by Croydon Police for public order trained officers not to have been sought earlier and that it was an error of judgement that the Metropolitan Police Service central command did not seek reinforcements through the Mutual Aid scheme earlier. Had the Police chosen different courses of action, they would have provided a greater level of policing resources to be available in Croydon during the course of 8 August and therefore allowed a greater level of patrols to be undertaken.

The Panel has also considered what additional Police support could have achieved if resources were available. On this issue, the Panel found that more visible Police Patrols in the shopping and district centres of Croydon during the course of 8 August 2011 could have made a difference. The Panel also finds that had Police reinforcements been requested and obtained earlier, particularly ones that had been level 2 public order trained, the extent of the rioting in Croydon would not have been as far reaching.

More Police and Council Dogs or Horses?

The Panel heard from a number of sources that more Police or Council dogs could have made a difference on 8 August 2011. Having considered information from a range of sources, the Panel found that more extensive use of guard dogs by individual retail premises could have made a difference for individual retailers because it could deter people from approaching, but that the use of dogs would not have been appropriate at the front line of the riot. The Panel also heard that the Council's dogs were not trained for such purposes and that use of them on 8 August could have been counter productive.

The Panel also gave consideration to whether additional Police horses could have made a difference on 8 August 2011. The Panel has been informed that the use of Police horses could have been helpful, but that due to the shortage of Police resources across London, they were not available during the rioting in Croydon.

More Senior Police Presence in the Council Control Room?

The Panel also considered the view that the presence of a more senior Police Officer, such as an Inspector, in the Council's CCTV control room could have made a difference on 8 August 2011. The Panel spoke with several people who were present at the CCTV control room and found that the presence of a more senior Police Officer was likely to have made a difference. The Panel heard that, in a command chain organisation such as the Police, the presence of a more senior officer is likely to give greater weight to information emanating from the CCTV control room and that messages may be dealt with more quickly. The Panel also heard that a more senior officer would have been likely to have been better qualified to interpret the information that was collected in the CCTV control room. The Panel considered this issue in the context of the circumstances of 8 August 2011. The Panel paid particular regard to the lack of resources available to the Police in Croydon and also to the widespread problems across London. The Panel found that, although there may have not been an Inspector to spare in Croydon on 8 August 2011, a more senior officer would have been likely to hold greater weight in ensuring that messages coming from the CCTV control room were acknowledged and dealt with more promptly.

More Secure Shop Shutters?

The Panel considered a range of information regarding the types of shutters available to secure shop frontages. The Panel gave particular regard to the report agreed by the Council's Cabinet on 12 December 2011. While the Panel was not minded to agree that any one particular type of shutter could have singularly prevented the wide scale looting on 8 August 2011, it did find that internal shutters, although more expensive, would be more difficult for looters to break through and that their introduction in areas that currently have an abundance of external shutters would be more visually pleasing and would improve the general appearance of those areas.

Recommendation 9

That the Council's policy of promoting internal shop shutters be implemented.

More Security Guards?

The Panel also heard information that supported the view that a higher presence of security guards in shops would have helped reduce the level of rioting on 8 August 2011. The Panel considered a range of information on this subject and found that the use of security guards was more likely to be beneficial to larger shops and shopping arcades, as these businesses could employ meaningful numbers of security guards. The Panel found that this would not have been a significant deterrent for sole traders, particularly those operating on London Road, as they would be unlikely to have the means to be able to employ the number of guards required to be a meaningful deterrent.

Better Communication with Shops Outside the Town Centre?

A number of people spoke to the Panel as to why shops outside the immediate town centre shopping area did not receive warnings about the potential for rioting during the course of 8 August 2011. The Panel also heard that the range of security schemes available for retail premises within the main town centre was often not taken up by shops outside of the main shopping area. The Panel found that those shops may benefit from participating in these security schemes, such as the radio link, and that they may have benefited if they had received earlier warnings regarding the potential for rioting on 8 August 2011.

Recommendation 10

That the Council gives consideration as to how best to develop or extend shop security networks, such as the radio link used by shops in North End, to those businesses operating outside the central shopping area in Croydon town centre.

Mobilising Community Based Staff?

A small number of people that met with the Panel questioned whether the Council could have mobilised its community based personnel, such as youth workers or community development officers, to try and talk to groups of people to prevent rioting. Examples of this happening in Kensington and Chelsea were mentioned to the Panel.

In considering this question, the Panel looked at whether this could have been appropriate in the circumstances of 8 August 2011 and / or whether it could be appropriate in other circumstances.

With regard to the circumstances of 8 August 2011, the Panel was concerned that it would not want to recommend to any agency that its staff be asked to undertake difficult and dangerous work for which it is not trained, particularly given the very volatile nature of the events on that day and night.

However, the Panel did consider that there may be circumstances when such steps could be helpful in diffusing tensions before they escalate.

Recommendation 11

That the Council gives consideration as to how and when pre-emptive mobilisation of its staff, such as youth workers or community development workers, could assist in the reduction of tensions within communities.

Stronger Community Networks?

The Panel was asked several times whether public agencies had made the best use of its community networks to try and prevent the rioting while tensions were escalating during the course of 8 August 2011 and over the preceding weekend. This question was regularly followed by the question of whether statutory agencies' community networks were reaching the right people and whether those community leaders were always able to influence those communities that they represent.

When this issue was raised with representatives of public agencies, the Panel heard a broadly similar picture that agencies had relatively well established networks, with a number of examples of strongly developed relationships, but also that there was an increasing recognition that more needed to be done to improve the reach of agencies to Croydon's varied communities, particularly those that did not traditionally engage with statutory authorities.

Recommendation 12

That the Police and the Council give consideration as to how and when it could better use its contacts with community leaders to assist in the prevention of civil disorder.

Recommendation 13

That Local Agencies give consideration to the adequacy of their existing networks within Croydon's varied communities, including young people and vulnerable adults, and to the development of those networks to encourage a greater relationship between Croydon's statutory agencies and varied communities.

Recommendation 14

That Croydon Council gives consideration to improving its processes for gathering and assessing information from social media networks to improve its understanding of its local communities.

Closing Down 'Phone and Social Media Networks?

The Panel was also asked to consider whether closing down mobile phone networks and/or social media networks on 8 August 2011 would have helped reduce the scale of the rioting in Croydon. The Panel gave this issue careful consideration and found that this would not have been a useful or positive action. While the Panel agreed that the participation of some rioters and looters would have involved the spread of information through mobile and social media networks, it felt that the significant television and media coverage of the rioting and looting would have provided that information to rioters and looters even if networks had been closed down. The Panel was also aware that the number of people who rioted in Croydon was less than 1% of the population, and that mobile and social media networks would have been used for positive reasons by a good portion of the 99% of Croydonians that chose not to riot.

Accordingly, no recommendation is made to close down mobile phone or social media networks.

Calling in the Army?

The Panel also heard a significant number of people who felt that the Army should have been called in to restore order on 8 August 2011.

Having considered this issue thoroughly, the Panel found that this would not have been a feasible option in Croydon. Specifically, the Panel considered the process that would have to be followed for the Army to be deployed during a civil disturbance.

That process would have involved a number of stages depending upon how it was instigated.

If the process had been instigated by the Council, the Chief Executive would contact the Deputy Lieutenant for Croydon, Colonel Ian MacRobbie. The Deputy Lieutenant would then contact the Ministry of Defence, within which an internal approval process would be required that would involve government ministers. Once relevant approval had been attained, then appropriate Army resources would have to be identified, mobilised and deployed.

If the process had been instigated by the Police, a formal request would be made to the Home Secretary, who would then have to follow a similar process through the Ministry of Defence.

The Panel considered that, even if the Army had been called for, the process to be followed would have meant that any forces deployed to the area would not have arrived until after the riot had finished.

Using Water Cannon and Rubber Bullets?

Similarly, the Panel considered whether the use of water cannon or attenuating energy projectiles (also known as rubber bullets or baton rounds) would have had an impact on the riots.

Again, the Panel gave this question careful consideration and found that the use of either water cannon or attenuating energy projectiles would not have been of any likely benefit on 8 August 2011. The Panel felt that water cannon would have been an indiscriminate method of moving rioters that lacked manoeuvrability and could have been used in only one area at a time. Given the lack of Police numbers, the Police would not have been able to move their line forward in any event.

The Panel also felt that attenuating energy projectiles would also have been inappropriate. Whilst noting that these projectiles have become safer to use, the Panel found that had the Police started firing on rioters this would have almost certainly inflamed the situation further and, given the lack of Police officers, this could have had significant negative consequences.

Is the Council's Emergency Plan Adequate?

The Panel also considered whether the Council's plan for emergencies, called the 'Civil Contingencies Plan', was adequately sufficient to cater for incidents such as the rioting on 8 August 2011.

The Panel found that, in the event, the Council's response to the riots had been highly commendable and debated whether the Plan required any amendment with the benefit of hindsight. The Panel found that there were two areas that the Council may wish to consider. These were that consideration should be given to:

- (i) whether there are circumstances when incidents happening in neighbouring Boroughs should act as an early warning that similar incidents are likely to happen in Croydon; and
- (ii) that when identifying which risks the Plan caters for, consideration should be given to not only the likelihood of a particular type of risk but also the likely impact of that risk, should it happen.

Limiting the Impact of Arson

Given the number of buildings damaged and destroyed by arson on 8 August 2011, the Panel considered whether greater use of sprinklers could have helped to save business premises and homes.

The Panel only received limited information on this point and did hear that the London Fire and Rescue Service was particularly supportive of fire prevention and containment measures such as sprinklers. However, the Panel did not hear anything that suggested that any of the buildings affected had not installed fire prevention or limitation devices in keeping with their lawful requirements.

The Panel did note that the buildings destroyed in Croydon were generally older buildings and less likely to have been designed or built with fire safety precautions in mind.

Establishing a National Guard

The Panel was also asked by a number of people to consider whether some form of official civilian reserve scheme, such as the National Guard scheme operated in the United States of America, should be created for incidents when the Police do not immediately have the resources required to deal with civil unrest.

The Panel considered several aspects of this suggestion and found that this would not be a practical step forward. The Panel felt in particular that any process to call out a form of reserves would not be likely to be completed within the timescale required.

The Panel also noted that a legal framework would be required that allowed the operation of any such reserves and that levels of training and competence would need to be routinely assessed. On this basis, the Panel found that this suggestion would be impractical. However, the Panel did note that the Special Constable scheme operated by the Police, which is unremunerated, carried a significant number of vacancies in Croydon and recommends the scheme to Croydon residents and noted that the Council had promoted the scheme amongst its own employees.

Recommendation 15

That Croydon Council gives consideration to identifying circumstances when incidents happening in neighbouring Boroughs could act as an early warning that similar incidents could be likely to occur in Croydon for inclusion within its Civil Contingencies Plan.

Tackling Long Term Disaffection and Underlying Tensions

Addressing Social Issues

The Panel heard a number of people who held the view that the work of community based service provision, that targeted underlying family and social issues, would help in preventing future riots and criminality more generally.

As described in section two of this report, the Panel found that existing underlying tensions and disaffection were a causal factor in the rioting, and this included a number of issues around supporting both young people and their families.

While the Panel recognises that there is not an easy solution or one size fits all approach to tackling underlying socio-economic problems, it did speak with people involved in a range of different schemes and services involved in this area of work.

The Panel was particularly impressed by those services that were multi-disciplinary in nature, which means that they looked at all the issues affecting an individual in the round, rather than just the one issue that brought them into contact with a professional public service. The Panel noted that this is a new approach nationally and heard examples of services that brought together educationalists, housing officers, social care workers and other support services that worked to tackle all the issues relating to that family rather than just a parent or a child. The Panel was also particularly impressed by those services that focused on early intervention before crime is committed and finds that those types of services are likely to help to prevent future rioting.

When considering this subject, the Panel was also informed of a range of services and provision made by community and voluntary sector groups. The Panel did hear of examples of how these services were being used as part of integrated packages of support for families and felt that their involvement should be encouraged.

Recommendation 16

That consideration be given to how local agencies and community and voluntary groups that provide supportive services can, wherever possible, further work together to deliver **holistic**, complementary and tailored support packages to individuals and their families to tackle concentrated underlying social problems.

Recommendation 17

That local agencies involved in multi-disciplinary service provision targeted at offenders and those at risk of offending give consideration as to how best to involve the myriad of community groups that exists across Croydon to support the individuals and families that they work with.

Improving the Physical Environment Around London Road

The Panel also considered whether improving the general environment of London Road would help to prevent future rioting and create a greater sense of civic pride in the area. When asked about this issue, people that met with the Panel, including representatives of the Council, were broadly in agreement that the London Road area required redevelopment and regeneration and the Panel is in agreement with this view.

One particular issue that was repeatedly raised by people who met the Panel was the derelict former Croydon General Hospital site on London Road. That this site had been vacant for a number of years was a clear source of anger and frustration within the London Road community.

Recommendation 18

That the Council and the Mayor of London give consideration to how best to manage the long term economic and community development of the West Croydon area, including supporting the business communities, and that the physical redevelopment of the area be used as an opportunity for supporting communities within that area.

Recommendation 19

That the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust be encouraged to work with other agencies and the local community to bring the vacant Croydon General Hospital site back into use as soon as possible.

Community Tensions regarding Crime and Disorder

During the course of the review, the Panel heard from a number of people who expressed the view that tensions between local communities and the Police were a causal factor in the rioting.

As described earlier in the report, the Panel did not find that the riots were in themselves a protest against the Police, but did agree that this was one of a range of underlying causal factors that were present before the riots took place. That said, the Panel did feel that this was a two way street and, while it did hear examples of areas where the Police could do more to develop its relationship with some communities, it did also hear examples of where the Police had tried to reach out to particular communities with little success.

Those tensions ranged around a number of different issues, but within those issues were a number of specific matters that were repeatedly raised.

One such issue that the Panel heard from a number of people was that the use of PCSOs by the Police was ineffective and a poor alternative to fully trained Police Officers. The Panel considered this view and found that it was not a significant factor in the rioting on 8 August 2011. However,

the Panel did hear a range of information that suggested that the use of PCSOs may suit the characteristics and the population of some areas better than others.

The Panel also heard from a number of people who it met with who raised the question of whether Croydon had an adequate number of Police Officers generally. This question was raised in the context of specific geographic locations, particularly in the New Addington and London Road areas. A number of people who lived in those areas suggested that full time police stations in London Road and New Addington would help to reduce crime and disorder in those areas.

The Panel also heard information regarding the overall level of Policing resources in Croydon and the suggestion that Croydon should receive greater Policing resources equivalent to those in the Boroughs of Lewisham, Wandsworth and Islington.

Recommendation 20

That the Metropolitan Police Service gives consideration to its resources in Croydon, with particular regard to:

- i) The potential benefits of more visible presence in both West Croydon and New Addington, possibly through the provision of full time Police stations in those areas;
- ii) The overall number of Police Officers in Croydon and whether that figure is in keeping with areas such as Lewisham, Wandsworth and Islington;
- iii) Whether the policing resources provided to Croydon takes sufficient account of the high levels of unreported crime and fear of crime in some areas of the Borough; and
- iv) Whether the current balance between the use of Police Officers and PCSOs is appropriate for each area in the Borough.

The issue of protectionism was raised with regard to shops on London Road by a number of people who met with the Panel. This issue was also raised with the Metropolitan Police Service and there was an acknowledgement that this was happening. The Panel heard of specific efforts made by Croydon Police to tackle this issue and difficulties that had been encountered when doing so.

Other longstanding issues of crime and disorder were repeatedly raised to the Panel regarding North West Croydon, including drug and alcohol crime, gang crime including gangs based on ethnicity, street crime and fear of reporting crime and reprisals.

The Panel is aware that both the Police and other agencies are already familiar with these issues and indeed heard of efforts that had been made to tackle some of them.

Still, the Panel felt that those issues in North West Croydon would benefit from a refreshed impetus and momentum. Earlier in this report we have described how the Panel was impressed with services that looked to tackle social and family problems in the round, with all agencies that could be involved looking at what could be done earlier before a particular situation deteriorates. Likewise, the Panel would suggest that consideration be given to using a similar approach to tackle the crime and disorder issues in North West Croydon, with agencies involved from throughout the Criminal Justice System working together to ascertain whether the collective public resource can be used in different ways to tackle the issues earlier.

Recommendation 21

That the Metropolitan Police Service gives consideration as to how a more visible policing presence can be provided in the North West Croydon area including London Road.

Recommendation 22

That all local service providers, both statutory and non-statutory, give consideration to how best to work with local communities to reduce the multiple crime and disorder issues in North West Croydon and London Road areas and that this need be prioritised.

Recommendation 23

That all agencies involved in the Criminal Justice system be encouraged to consider how their resources could alternatively be used to prevent crime and disorder in Croydon (as per the community budget model).

The Panel also heard from a number of people regarding the working relationship between different communities and the Police. The Panel is fully aware of the range of efforts made by the Police to engage with communities to develop relationships and build trust and confidence. That said, given the number of people who considered this as a problem, the Panel finds that it would be a helpful step for the Police to reconsider how they manage these relationships, particularly with those people and groups that do not use traditional routes of access to communicate with public agencies.

Recommendation 24

That the Metropolitan Police Service prioritises the rebuilding of trust and understanding between itself and young people and young adults in Croydon.

Appendices

Summary of Recommendations

Recommendation 1

That the Metropolitan Police Service gives consideration to improving its processes for gathering and assessing information and intelligence from social media networks for the purposes of reducing crime and disorder.

Recommendation 2

That the Police and Council give consideration to their communication strategies during large scale incidents to ensure that as many relevant people as possible, such as businesses, residents and community leaders, receive accurate and up to date information on evolving incidents as appropriate to the circumstances so that they can take steps to prevent or mitigate harm.

Recommendation 3

The Panel supports the Metropolitan Police Service's decision to review its mobilisation plan and recommends that consideration be given to:

- i) Directing Level 2 support units from other Boroughs directly to places where they are required rather than gathered in a central area;
- ii) Increasing the number of Level 2 trained officers across the service;
- iii) How the plan is likely to be affected during school holiday periods when public services are likely to be reduced by higher numbers of officers and staff being on annual leave;
- iv) Earlier requests for assistance from other Police Forces, either informally or through the mutual aid scheme;
- v) How the Police communication network is affected by large scale incidents taking place in multiple areas across London at the same time;
- vi) The risk assessment arrangements for Boroughs that have Policing resources taken for use elsewhere and the stages at which provision in those Boroughs is reviewed;
- vii) Ensuring that Boroughs that have their Level 2 public order trained Policing resources taken for use elsewhere are not left without any Level 2 public order trained resources; and
- viii) Taking into account the requirements of areas outside immediate town centres when considering the level of Policing resources required for incidents.

Recommendation 4

That the Government reform the processes by which payments are currently made under the Riot Damages Act in order to achieve quicker payments for persons claiming under that Act.

Recommendation 5

That the local Community Safety Partnership undertakes detailed analysis of the profiles of persons convicted of rioting in Croydon to provide further understanding of who rioted in Croydon and why.

Recommendation 6

That the Metropolitan Police Service gives consideration to how best to rebuild confidence in the wider community following the riots, particularly with regard to those communities that are historically disconnected from the Police.

Recommendation 7

That local agencies give consideration in the round to planning for summer holiday periods to mitigate the circumstances of the impact of high levels of annual leave on public services and large numbers of children and young people not attending school, college or university.

Recommendation 8

That the Metropolitan Police Service's review of its stop and search policy includes consideration of:

- i) a reduction in the overall number of stop and searches that are not intelligence based to achieve better targeting of the use of stop and search;
- ii) ensuring as far as reasonably possible that stop and search is undertaken in a dignified manner that does not cause disaffection with those persons being stopped and searched; and
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Recommendation 18

That the Council and the Mayor of London give consideration to how best to manage the long term economic and community development of the West Croydon area, including supporting the business communities, and that the physical redevelopment of the area be used as an opportunity for supporting communities within that area.

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- iii) Whether the policing resources provided to Croydon takes sufficient account of the high levels of unreported crime and fear of crime in some areas of the Borough; and
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That all agencies involved in the Criminal Justice system be encouraged to consider how their resources could alternatively be used to prevent crime and disorder in Croydon (as per the community budget model).

Recommendation 24

That the Metropolitan Police Service prioritises the rebuilding of trust and understanding between itself and young people and young adults in Croydon.

About the Panel

The Independent Local Review Panel was established by the Leader of Croydon Council following consultation with his Cabinet on 19 September 2011 under section 2 of the Local Government Act 2000.

The Panel has been comprised of five members, namely:

His Honour William Barnett QC (Chairman)

Pastor Damain Luke (Vice-Chairman)

Councillor Jan Buttinger

Councillor Sean Fitzsimons

Mrs. Stella Okeahialam MBE

His Honour William Barnett QC

His Honour William Barnett QC is a retired judge with close links to Croydon.

He specialised in negligence cases when practicing at the Bar. He was appointed Queen's Counsel in 1984 and sat as a recorder in Croydon. Thereafter for more than 10 years he sat in the Crown Court and the County Court in Croydon as a circuit judge – presiding over civil and family cases in the County Court.

Away from the courts, His Honour has also sat on a number of tribunals and panels, including the Thalidomide Injuries Assessment Panel, the Mental Health Review Tribunal and also appeared as Counsel in the Legionella Inquiry (Stafford) 1985-1986.

He is a governor of the Whitgift Foundation and is also a governor at Whitgift, Trinity and Old Palace of John Whitgift Schools.

Damian Luke

Damian Luke is the Leader of Praise House and the Chair of Black Churches in Croydon (BCC). He is also one of the Church Convenors and Borough Deans in Croydon who work for Church unity and who also represent the Churches in leading discussions with the local authority, Police and various statutory, non-statutory and faith organisations.

He is a Church leader with a deep commitment to challenging disunity and forging relationships that build unity. He is passionate about building a community that everyone feels a part of and where everyone makes a positive contribution that ultimately enhances and adds value to where we live and work in.

Damian is also a member of various Croydon Advisory/Committee Boards of Statutory and Voluntary Organisations, as well as a member of the Croydon Fostering Panel.

Damian lives in Croydon with his family.

Councillor Jan Buttinger

Councillor Jan Buttinger is a Conservative Member for Kenley Ward.

Jan Buttinger has been a Kenley Councillor since 1998 and is chair of the Council's Corporate Services Committee. She was previously the chair of the Scrutiny Committee.

Councillor Sean Fitzsimons

Councillor Sean Fitzsimons is a Labour Member for Addiscombe Ward.

Sean has represented Addiscombe as a Councillor since 1994, apart from four years between 2006 and 2010. Sean chaired the main Scrutiny and Overview Committee between 2002 and 2006 when Labour was the Majority Group, he also chaired the Pan-London Scrutiny Network during this time. He is currently Labour's lead member on the Scrutiny Committee and chairs the cross-party Health Scrutiny Committee.

Mrs. Stella Okeahialam MBE

Stella Okeahialam MBE is Programme Director at the Institute for Sustainability and is responsible for the quality and execution of the Institute's programmes, ensuring robust risk reporting and effective programme governance. She also leads on delivering Resource Efficient Buildings projects for the Institute.

Prior to joining the Institute, Stella worked at the London Development Agency (LDA) as the Head of Skills and Employment, pulling together a portfolio of projects and programmes that respond to the challenges of London's labour market, creating sustainable employment for Londoners.

Before the LDA, Stella worked in Local Government and has over 13 years' experience of working in Croydon delivering various programmes in economic development, regeneration and community renewal. Stella also has private sector experience having worked in the banking and private healthcare sectors.

Stella was awarded an MBE in 2010 for her services to business and enterprise. She lives in Croydon with her family.

Process followed by the Panel during the Review

The review undertaken by the Panel has been based on thorough administrative arrangements and has been focused on ensuring that as many people as possible get the chance to have their say.

At the outset, the Panel has been in communication with the National Communities and Victims Panel to ensure that our two separate reviews can dovetail each other. In keeping with its terms of reference, and where it has had permission to do so, the Croydon Panel has supplied the information that it has gathered and its findings with the National Panel.

Ensuring Participation

In order to ensure as many people as possible could contribute to this review, the Panel undertook a thorough publicity campaign which included:

- Posters throughout the Borough
- Posters at Tram stops
- Establishing a dedicated web page on the CroydonOnline website and information posted on the main Council website
- Flyers and posters were distributed to shops, businesses and organisations in the affected areas, as well as council buildings, including libraries
- 40,000 flyers were delivered to homes in areas affected by the rioting
- Leaflets were handed out at West and East Croydon stations during rush hour periods
- Supporting Croydon and Your Croydon 'special' ebulletins were sent out to residents
- Full page adverts were placed in the Croydon Guardian, Croydon Advertiser and the Advertiser midweek
- A press call and press release were issued to local and regional media

- Updates were made via social media such as Facebook and Twitter
- The Panel secretariat attended Croydon's Recovery events to promote participation
- Additional leaflets were sent to:
 - Residents Association representatives
 - People that registered at Council Question Time or Recovery events
 - All businesses affected by the riots
 - All households that were displaced by the riots
 - All local Councillors, MPs, MEPs, MYPs, the Youth Council and the Greater London Assembly Member for Croydon
 - All Croydon schools
 - All Croydon Neighbourhood Partnerships
 - All Businesses in the London Road area
 - All voluntary organisations in Croydon
 - All Neighbourhood watch contacts
 - All Croydon community faith and voluntary sector contacts
 - All persons registered with the Police Independent Advisory Group
- Officers also visited businesses on London Road to offer support with writing statements
- Neighbourhood Enforcement Officers distributed leaflets in West Croydon, South Croydon and New Addington
- All relevant public agencies were written to asking for their contributions.

The campaign for contributions was also supported by the creation of an online form on the Panel's web page and a dedicated email inbox was also established.

The publicity campaign garnered 194 responses from members of the public and business owners. A number of photographs and videos of the rioting were also provided by Croydon residents and these were also taken into account. Many people directed the Panel to relevant videos available on 'YouTube' and other places on the internet, which the Panel also watched and took into consideration.

The Panel also received written information from six public agencies. This information was supported by a number of other background documents that the Panel used to develop its information base. This set of documents totalled just over 100 separate pieces of information and included documents such as the community strategy, corporate strategy and children and young people's plan. As the work of the Panel progressed, it also included the findings of other reviews of the rioting.

Public Meetings

Before commencing its public meetings, the Panel undertook a tour of the major areas affected by the rioting in Croydon.

The Panel used its information base to identify which people it had heard from that it needed to meet with to clarify their information and ask further questions. To that end, the Panel held 17 public meetings. These meetings were advertised widely and, in the majority of cases, attended by the local press. During those meetings, the Panel met with residents affected by the rioting, business owners and employees affected by the rioting, local agency representatives, community leaders including Councillors, MPs, an MYP and the Croydon Greater London Assembly Member, youth groups, an expert on gangs and two representatives of the local press that had reported directly from the riots on 8 August 2011.

In its meetings with public agencies, the Panel gave an indication of the areas that it wished to ask questions upon in advance and asked that those agencies chose representatives that would be able to answer questions on those subjects.

The Panel held one private meeting with persons that had been convicted of offences related to the riots.

The Panel made every effort to arrange its meetings so that as many people as possible could attend. This included holding meetings in Central Croydon, the London Road area, South Croydon, New Addington and Fieldway. The Panel also held meetings in the evening and at the weekend to encourage people that work during office hours to attend.

Agreeing Findings

Having completed its public meetings, the Panel considered the information that was available to it in order to reach conclusions and consider recommendations in keeping with its terms of reference.

The Panel identified any information gaps that it felt existed and sought to answer these through written correspondence as far as was possible.

The Panel then considered the issues that had been raised on which it was required to reach a conclusion. Having drawn together its conclusions, the Panel then established its findings and recommendations.

Draft versions of this report have been tested with relevant agencies prior to publication to ensure its factual accuracy.

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Croydon Guardian
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London Fire Brigade
The Metropolitan Police Service
Croydon Xpress
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